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Abstract
Entrepreneurship research has gravitated towards a singular focus on the Silicon Valley 
model as the standard model of entrepreneurship. By contrast, some entrepreneurship 
scholars have more recently suggested embracing entrepreneurship as diverse and colorful. 
We build on this latter stream of literature by analyzing the diversity of entrepreneurship 
from complementary institutional arrangements inherent in national economies. Drawing 
from Robert’s (2004) model of complementarities between context and organizational 
choice variables, we analyze the contextualization of diverging entrepreneurship models. 
Our findings indicate that some economies are complementary to a specialized niche strate-
gy, while others instead promote a scalable mass- market manifestation of entrepreneurship.
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One of the most compelling challenges confronting the academic field of entrepreneurship is to 
move beyond the singular model and context for entrepreneurship. A narrow and one dimen-
sional view of entrepreneurship not only restricts the analysis to certain theories and contexts but 
ultimately limits how entrepreneurship is understood, which contexts are to be assumed and 
which theoretical considerations entrepreneurship researchers are pursuing (Baker & Welter, 
2018; Welter et al., 2019). In line with this view, Welter et al. (2019) point out that “the context 
of most entrepreneurship research (...) was narrow, stable, and largely taken for granted.” Such 
a narrow view predicts ”a decontextualized standard model of entrepreneurship (...), which con-
sidered entrepreneurship as high- growth, technology driven, and venture capital- backed” and is 
“referred to as the Silicon Valley Model” (Welter et al., 2019, p. 320). Drawing from the same 
kind of reasoning, Welter et al. (2017) therefore call to embrace the heterogeneity of the concept. 
The heterogeneity inherent in a multi- context analysis of entrepreneurship can best be analyzed 
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through the lens provided by diverse institutional contexts. The contextualization is necessary to 
understand the type or emergence of a particular manifestation of entrepreneurship, its intensity 
and frequency, and geographical location and its dynamics, in which entrepreneurship actually 
occurs. In light of the colorful diversity of entrepreneurship and its underlying contextualization, 
it may be that entrepreneurship research has been asking the wrong question. Too often, the focus 
of analysis has revolved around increasing more of a particular manifestation of entrepreneur-
ship that maps on to a specific context. Unfortunately, this has sublimated even more important 
questions into the background, such as whether and how entrepreneurship in its many forms and 
manifestation differs across different contexts. A diverse view on entrepreneurship incorporates 
that more of it is simply not always better.
We thus align with an emerging stream in entrepreneurship research that opposes this singular 
view and postulates that we “should not restrict ourselves to a singular meaning of entrepreneur-
ship, but should instead fully embrace heterogeneity and differences” (Welter et al., 2017, p. 7). 
From this we already know that contexts can be diverse and that contexts shape the heterogeneity 
of the various manifestations of entrepreneurship (Welter, 2011; Welter et al., 2017, 2019). The 
diversity of entrepreneurship can manifest itself in a variety of forms, which aligns to disparate 
geographical locations, dynamic sequences, main actors, sources of financing, social capital, and 
so on. Examples of different manifestations of entrepreneurship that the literature has already has 
pointed out in this sense are mundane entrepreneurship (Rehn & Taalas, 2004), everyday entre-
preneurship (Welter et al., 2017) and real entrepreneurship (Aldrich & Ruef, 2018).
We examine institutional regimes at the country level, which can be described by the same 
context- choice variables in their complementarities, but which take on different expressions. In 
our context- choice model, this means that entrepreneurs either adapt to a specific context or have 
to change to another context. Thus, we assume the context as given. We argue that the different 
regimes are internally rather homogeneous and attract companies that are capable of adapting to 
the institutional context. Companies, which do not succeed or succeed worse than others in 
achieving a strategy- environment fit are likely to be forced out of the market (Barney, 1991). 
Thus, adaptation is necessary to develop strategies complementary to the context.
In our contribution to literature, we derive the diversity of entrepreneurship from institutional 
complementarities inherent in national economic systems that embed and contextualize entrepre-
neurial behavior. These complementarities eventually shape a certain type of entrepreneurship 
that is most present in a national economy, according to its institutional toolbox. Thus, the com-
plementarity of context and organizational choice variables constitutes the different types of 
entrepreneurship that we examine (niche- market and scalable entrepreneurship). Applying 
Robert’s model of the complementarities of context and organizational choice variables is one of 
the novel contributions of this paper and fits into a literature strand that addresses the Varieties of 
Capitalism (Herrmann, 2019; Pahnke & Welter, 2019). Thus, we focus on the diverse nature of 
entrepreneurship, which is where we differ from previous research on entrepreneurship that 
rather focused on the varying extent of entrepreneurship. We do not favor one type of entrepre-
neurship over another, but rather point out that different manifestations of entrepreneurship gen-
erate innovative manifestations of it. In the past, the Silicon Valley model has often been studied 
as the standard model. To this effect, the Mittelstand has been contrasted to it as another prime 
example of two very innovative and critically acclaimed types of entrepreneurship. Both models 
resemble archetypical examples of entrepreneurial manifestations and have grown into estab-
lished and conceptually linked terms (Audretsch, 2019; Lehmann et al., 2019; Pahnke & Welter, 
2019; Welter et al., 2017, 2019). However, we extend research on this topic through taking a 
much broader view, as we distinguish between niche and scale entrepreneurship.
Therefore, our theoretical framework analyzes a scalable mass- market to niche strategy con-
tinuum of entrepreneurial models. While some national contexts are more conducive to 
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generating world- market leaders pursing incremental innovation and niche strategies, other 
national contexts are more conducive to the Silicon Valley type of entrepreneurship with its 
emphasis on radical innovation and scale- up (Brouthers et al., 2015; Covin & Wales, 2019; 
Pahnke & Welter, 2019; Tang et al., 2017). In a comprehensive overview, we describe a set of 
complementary variable pairs that explain the divergence of niche and scale entrepreneurship.
While the focus of this paper lies in its conceptual analysis, section five shows that our 
assumptions find empirical support. We descriptively point to the diverging spread of Niche and 
Silicon Valley Entrepreneurship and later go on to empirically study the contextualization of 
Niche Entrepreneurship. Our analysis uses a unique and hand- selected dataset consisting of 217 
countries to empirically investigate what kind of contexts are conducive for Niche 
Entrepreneurship. Potential context variables that match complementarily according to the scale- 
niche contextual framework include the tax regimes, corporate board regimes, the educational 
system, along with other national context specific characteristics.
The remainder of our study is structured as follows: the second section of the paper aligns our 
research with the relevant extant literature in order to illustrate our contribution. Section 3 intro-
duces our theoretical framework. Section 4 provides a discourse of the causal linkages of the 
selected choice- context variable pairs. In section 5, an empirical analysis of our propositions is 
presented. Section 6 concludes.
The Heterogeneity of Entrepreneurship as a Theory of Resource 
Complementarities
For decades, the Silicon Valley model of entrepreneurship was synonymous with entrepreneurship 
throughout the literature, leaving a picture to be painted of too few facets and colors of the phenom-
enon (Welter et al., 2017). In this paper, we contrast the Silicon Valley model with another type of 
entrepreneurship that emulates niche strategies. We argue that economies seem to favor either one or 
the other, depending upon the national contexts. To this effect, we extend efforts to contextualize 
entrepreneurship, and use the national institutional framework to examine how niche or scale econ-
omies emerge as an entrepreneurial strategy. Thus, just not a singular type of entrepreneurship but 
rather disparate types of entrepreneurship enhance the economic welfare of national economies. It is 
fundamental to our line of reasoning that the question of contextualization lies at heart of under-
standing entrepreneurship as a heterogeneous phenomenon.
Reviewing the literature, a number of studies recently have challenged this homogeneous 
view of entrepreneurship. For example, Welter et al. (2017) argue that entrepreneurship is inher-
ently heterogeneous depending upon the underlying context. Focusing on the context implies 
that the manifestation of entrepreneurial behavior and thinking is inevitably embedded in the 
institutional environment of an economy (Welter, 2011), and therefore the ensuing heterogeneity 
of entrepreneurship reflects the heterogeneity of the underlying national and institutional con-
texts. While each context may span across multiple geographic levels of analysis, the national 
level of the institutional context always corresponds to interactions with the individual level, for 
example, the incentives confronting the individual entrepreneur.
A number of context variables have already been analyzed in previous research, and were 
found to determine the type of entrepreneurial strategy and manifestation. Welter (2011) devel-
ops a typology of contexts and differs between a business, social, spatial and institutional dimen-
sion. These context dimensions affect organizational choice variables at once and suggest a 
dynamic role for history and time. Pahnke and Welter (2019) contrast the Silicon Valley model 
of entrepreneurship with the German Mittelstand model, and illustrate how distinct strategies are 
shaped to achieve innovativeness. This reinforces the notion that concepts such as entrepreneur-
ial orientation have mostly been applied in a one dimensional manner in relation to the Silicon 
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Valley model (Deloitte, 2016; Rauch et al., 2009; Wiklund, 1999). However, niche firms can also 
achieve a strong entrepreneurial orientation. As most niche entrepreneurs are family firms that 
serve quasi- monopolistic markets, a stream within the family business literature describes family 
firms as risk- averse (Morck et al., 1998; Naldi et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2001), which hampers 
innovation (Zahra, 2005). However, similar to firms emulating a Silicon Valley model, niche 
world- market leaders are characterized by a pro- active opportunity strategy, high investments in 
research and development (R&D) and a high degree of innovativeness. What distinguishes both 
types of firms instead, is their nature of innovation, as elaborated further below.
In order to avoid the fallacy inherent in comparing “apples (a single high- growth company) 
to oranges (a whole segment of the German Economy)” (Pahnke & Welter, 2019, p. 353), we 
examine different market types on the same level and their corresponding strategies that either 
target scalable high- growth platform markets or market niches. Niche economies are character-
ized by contextual factors that work especially in favor of firms that tailor highly specialized, 
technologically sophisticated products. Market leadership is therefore often a direct result from 
having a quasi- monopoly within the product niche, so that internationalization serves as an 
essential strategy to achieve growth within the narrow market niche. Operating mostly in busi-
ness to business markets, often residing in rural areas and shying away from obtaining finance on 
capital markets enables firms with a niche strategy to remain out of the public view. Niche mar-
ket firms tend to be family owned and owner- managed, which is conducive to leadership conti-
nuity and yields benefits in terms of long- term investments in the knowledge base. By contrast, 
scale economies breed high- tech firms that, if they survive, can command a market value in 
excess of a billion dollars at their initial public offering (IPO). Firms in the scale economy con-
text typically rely on venture capital backing and disrupt markets through radical innovation. 
While often residing in knowledge clusters, they capitalize on spillovers and agglomerations. 
Thus, both types of companies are different prime examples of their respective manifestation of 
entrepreneurship, for which this study explores their complementary contextualization.
While this section has highlighted contextualization to embrace entrepreneurship as heteroge-
neous, we add to the previous literature in this stream and establish the rationale of entrepreneur-
ial diversity in the complementarity between contextual and organizational choice variables 
(Roberts, 2004). We reason that its complementary deployment explains the emergence and 
prevalence of a certain manifestations of entrepreneurship (scalable vs niche market entrepre-
neurship) within a certain national economy. Following up on this, the next section introduces 
our theoretical framework, building on the concept of complementarity of choice and context 
variables as proposed by Roberts (2004).
Theoretical Framework
This study focuses on national economies and the way that national and institutional contexts 
provide the platform for cohesive systems of entrepreneurship. According to this view, nations as 
a focal point of analysis are the key to understanding economic behavior, because they establish 
jurisdictions, entail historical and path- dependent grown skill and resource bases and shape gov-
ernment policies to maintain a competitive advantage in a particular locational and institutional 
context. While the contemporary globalized economy enhances the central role played by knowl-
edge as a source of competitiveness, the capacity to innovate and the patterns of competitiveness 
differ largely across countries. Thus, nations have to specialize in industries, for which their 
national institutional patterns and resource base suits them best. We argue, that both, exogenous 
and endogenous factors together, constitute asset and resource complementarity (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2009; Wright et al., 2008), leading to abnormal rents. As Roberts (2004, p. 39) shows, 
asset and resource complementarity follows specific or coherent patterns, and what typically 
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does not work is to ‘mix and match’ among elements. Countries differ in their endowments, 
along with their norms and institutions (Chowdhury et al., 2019), taxes and legal rules, gover-
nance structures, and of course geography, leading not only to different economic outcomes 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2015), but also to very different manifestations of entrepreneurship 
(Terjesen et al., 2016). Thus, entrepreneurship is not homogeneous across national and institu-
tional contexts, but various strategies exist that enable national economies to compete interna-
tionally. Figure 1 demonstrates the geographic spread of niche and scale economies, which 
indicates coherent, but rather divergent patterns. Niche economies are characterized through the 
number of world- market leaders on a national- level, scale economies through the number of 
unicorns. The figure demonstrates that countries seem to specialize their entrepreneurial models 
in one or the other, given their distinct set of resources.
Building on this line of reasoning, we contribute to explaining the divergence of national 
systems of entrepreneurship through the concept of complementarities, as applied by Milgrom 
and Roberts (1995), Wright et al. (2008) and Wiklund and Shepherd (2009), resulting in different 
but coherent manifestations of entrepreneurial behavior.
A microeconomic view of complementarity refers to capital inputs for any kind of production 
function a manager controls. Against this backdrop, Roberts (2004) compared mass production 
to modern manufacturing, where two choice variables are complementary if “doing more of one 
of them increases the returns to doing more of the other” (Roberts, 2004, p. 34). Roberts argues 
that the idea of compliments and substitutes “can be extended to relations among aspects of the 
environment and the designer’s choice variables” (2004, p. 36). In this case, “a choice variable 
is complementary with an element of the environment if an increase in the level of the 
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of niche and scale economies. Source. own depiction, data retrieved 
from Rammer and Spielkamp (2015), data of unicorns from Fortune (2017) measured as per 10 Million 
capita. For reasons of graphical representation the values for unicorns are per 100,000 capita.
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environmental variable increases the returns to introducing or increasing the choice variable” 
(2004, p. 36). A matching combination of two variables therefore exhibits systemic effects - the 
additive value of both individual variables is lower than compared to a situation of their simulta-
neous and complementary presence. We posit that the variation inherent in national systems of 
entrepreneurship and the ensuring manifestation of entrepreneurial activity mainly depends on 
the complementarity between contextual and organizational choice variables.
We introduce a theoretical framework that aligns the path and context dependent manifesta-
tion of entrepreneurial models and the concept of complementarity. Our framework is displayed 
in Figure 2. The figure displays four quadrants and adopts the view of the resource allocation of 
a singular economy. The model proposes that only certain pairs of variables result in pareto- 
optimal context- choice complementarities. Here, the context variables within the model can 
assume two different values on the horizontal axis, as explained in the example below. The same 
applies to the organizational choice variables on the vertical axis. Thus, the matrix depicts differ-
ent combinations of possible pairs of variables, where certain pairs have a complementary effect 
and thus a stronger overall effect on the economy can be expected. Context variables can assume 
the values α and β for a characteristic i, organizational choice variables can assume the values α 
and β for a characteristic j. Complementary pairings are possible between αi and αj (quadrant III), 
as well as βi and βj (quadrant I). In the example, quadrant III are complementary institutional 
arrangements of a scale economy and quadrant I for the niche economy. The axes deliberately 
have no arrows and thus no scaling - quadrant III could just as well mean a niche economy fit and 
quadrant I a scale economy fit. It is only important that a pairing of noncomplementary variable 
pairs is inferior, like quadrants II and IV.
Examples for context variables include tax regimes, board systems and the educational sys-
tem, while organizational choice variables include long- term management succession, family 
ownership control and the stock of specific human capital. Choice variables are contextual and 
reflect institutions and public policy, which in turn shapes the strategic fit of the organization 
Figure 2. Theoretical framework. source. own depiction.
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adapting to the environment. In particular, our framework focuses on the requirements of com-
plementarities resulting in heterogeneous manifestations of entrepreneurship, ranging from scale 
to niche strategies.
The framework illustrates that there is no one size fits all solution of variable pairs. As long as 
choice variables are matched complementarily, a national context may succeed in generating a 
unique and welfare stimulating manifestation or model of entrepreneurship. Any matches located 
on the diagonal line of complementarity thus maximize the size of efficiency gains from comple-
mentary choice variables. The framework shows that economic welfare maximization in a 
national context is compatible with a particular type and specific manifestation of entrepreneur-
ship. Of course, the choice variables typically are not completely dichotomous, which implies 
that each national context will exhibit heterogeneous types of entrepreneurship.
To give an example for a context- choice variable pair, a unique institution specific to Germany, 
along with several other countries, such as Switzerland and Austria, is centrally organized voca-
tional training and education (context variable) that is conducive to a particular type of skilled 
labor that provides niche firms with access to specialized product skills (choice variable). The 
high value of specific skilled labor is complementary and therefore conducive to the human 
resource needs compatible with the entrepreneurship niche strategy. As long as the choice vari-
ables are congruent with the specific type or manifestation of entrepreneurship, ranging from 
mass- market scaling to a niche strategy, economic welfare will be maximized.
To clarify our argument, we would like to give a further example for archetypical context- 
variable pairs and their complementarity for niche or scale strategies. World- market leaders 
are mainly family firms from rural areas. An example of one of these firms is the Testo SE & 
Co. KGaA, a world- market leader, which engineers measuring instruments. Firms like these 
benefit from soft inheritance taxation regimes, as families find it easier to establish family 
dynasties over generations. Testo has remained owner- managed by the Knospe family, ever 
since its foundation in 1957. Dualistic board structures therefore allow families to exert con-
trol on a long- term basis. Testo is located in Titisee- Neustadt, a village in the region of 
Breisgau- Hochschwarzwald with a population of only 12,269, which increases the mutual 
lock- in of employees and employers, since outside opportunities in the labor market are only 
marginally available. Employees can remain rooted in their home areas through such rural 
companies, which increases the bond between employees and the company. Testo SE is a train-
ing company in the German VET. This means that employees are able to complete an appren-
ticeship in the company combining working within the company and being educated at 
vocational schools. In 2018, 48 apprentices started their training at Testo. The specific human 
capital built up in this way is particularly complementary to the human capital requirements of 
highly specialized niche companies.
On the other hand, Asana is a good example of a company using a scaling model. The Silicon 
Valley company is a unicorn and was valued at $1.5 billion in 2018. It is a very fast growing 
company, as it was recently founded, in 2008, and offers productivity software. Asana uses arti-
ficial intelligence and machine learning to support the project management of companies. It 
primarily relies on venture capital (including 8VC, Benchmark Capital) to finance its growth and 
succeeded in raising $125 million, in 2018 alone. Thus, the company takes advantage of the more 
liquid traditional capital and therewith related more liquid venture capital market in the U.S., 
which is typical for common law countries. Finally, the Silicon Valley is an industry cluster 
favoring the agglomeration of high- tech companies through potential knowledge spillovers.
Drawing a conclusion, our model shows how different contexts favor the fit of complemen-
tary choice variables accordingly. In particular, we point out how different contexts shape econ-
omies on a niche to scale strategy continuum. It is important to underline that one sided 
stimulations of only one variable of context- choice pairs will prove to be ineffective. Stimulating 
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one of the variables of context- variable pairs, essentially requires the manipulation of the com-
plement and vice versa.
The Complementarities of Niche and Scale Economies
This section introduces several examples of institutions that explain why some economies are 
more conducive to a niche entrepreneurial strategy, while others are more conducive to the entre-
preneurial model of scaling up. The different institutional regimes bestow a competitive advan-
tage of specific manifestations in particular national contexts. Table 1 gives an overview.
Inheritance Taxation
While taxes in general may influence how entrepreneurship is manifested, inheritance and gift 
taxation play a particularly important role. The inheritance tax generally refers to the taxation of 
the transfer of wealth between generations, typically as a result of death. By contrast, the gift tax 
refers to the taxation of wealth transfer that occurs during someone’s lifetime. Most national 
jurisdictions treat the inheritance and gift taxes symmetrically to avoid tax avoidance strategies.
However, there is variation in the way that the inheritance tax is administered across coun-
tries. For example, the continental European countries typically levy the inheritance tax by clas-
sifying heirs according to kinship. By contrast, other countries, such as the United Kingdom and 
United States apply an estate tax for valuation with a flat tax that avoids subsequent classifica-
tions. Still other countries have abolished their inheritance tax, such as Canada in 1972, Portugal 
in 2003, Slovakia in 2004, Sweden in 2008 and Romania in 2011.
Not only does the United States not privilege close family members and family businesses, 
but there is a maximum tax rate of 40 percent. The high inheritance taxes not only impede the 
succession in family- owned businesses, but they are conducive to mass- market driven firms, 
Table 1. Context Variables.
Context Context variable favoring niche 
economy
Context variable favoring scale 
economy
Inheritance Taxation soft taxation regimes (high free 
credits, low rates)
strict taxation regimes (low free 
credits, high rates)
System of Corporate Boards dualistic monistic
Legal Origin civil law common law
Capital Market Development bank- based economies, 
underdeveloped traditional 
and venture capital markets
market- based economies, liquid 
traditional and venture capital 
markets
Economic Geography geographic decentralization, 
localized in rural areas, 
closed knowledge production 
function (high vertical 
integration)
geographic centralization, high 
degree of urbanization, 
importance of knowledge clusters 
and knowledge spillovers
System of Vocational Education education as a public good; 
important role of vocational 
schools as provider of 
tertiary education (specific 
human capital)
private investments in the skill base; 
universities as main provider of 
tertiary education (general human 
capital)
Note. own depiction.
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because the owners of a business can avoid the tax burden involved with inheritance by selling 
the firm through an initial public offering (IPO). Thus, the tax incentives in the United States 
work against long- term strategic niche family businesses and instead are conducive to the more 
disruptive technologies and exit strategies in generating highly innovative and high growth com-
panies, such as unicorns.
By contrast, countries with a less imposing inheritance tax, such as Switzerland, Germany and 
Austria may be conducive to family firms implementing a niche strategy, which often results in 
market leadership within the world niche. Such niche strategies are developed over long periods 
of time, in the organizational context of family business, where family dynasties have built their 
businesses across generations. This might suggest that the inheritance and gift tax regimes con-
tribute to explaining why entrepreneurship manifests itself in mass market growth and innova-
tive strategies in some national contexts, such as the United States, or what has been termed as 
the Silicon Valley model of entrepreneurship, and in strategic niches in other national contexts, 
such as the Mittelstand in Germany, Switzerland and Austria.
Two disparate strands of literature have analyzed the impact of the inheritance tax and gift tax 
on the performance and success of family business. On the hand is the strand of literature con-
sidering the inheritance tax and gift tax as a death tax, which is a financial burden that can have 
a deleterious impact on the investment and growth of a company, and ultimately can lead to the 
sale or liquidation of the company (Bjuggren & Sund, 2001; Jestl, 2018; Tsoutsoura, 2015). In 
fact, studies (Carney et al., 2014; Ellul et al., 2010) have found that in those national contexts 
where the inheritance tax is low, inconsequential or nonexistence, family firms exhibit greater 
intergenerational stability and longevity (Carney et al., 2014; Ellul et al., 2010). For example, 
Ellul et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence that the level of investments in family firms is 
adversely impacted by the burden of high inheritance taxes due to liquidity constraints in those 
national contexts with a severe inheritance tax. They also find that the impact of the inheritance 
tax on family business investment is even more pronounced in those national contexts with lower 
protection of investors. The reason is that strong legal investor protection is conducive to financ-
ing the first- best level of investment. By contrast, in those national contexts with a weak investor 
protection, external finance cannot compensate for the high costs imposed by inheritance taxes.
A second strand of literature suggests that high inheritance taxes can reduce the agency costs 
of families (Braun et al., 2017), because the anticipated and predictable tax burden resulting from 
inheritance disciplines families in the consumption of private benefits. This view is based on the 
assumption that family leadership implies the pursuit of nonpurely economic goals for private 
utility maximization, thus influencing economic and firm- strategic first- best solutions: this 
includes the expansion of the family dynasty, even if external nonfamily leadership could be 
performance- enhancing, as well as any form of self- dealing, tunneling, entrenchment, and so on.
Exemplarily, there is a robust and compelling literature that has clearly found that the 
inheritance tax law in Germany is conducive to the intergenerational successions of its 
Mittelstand family firms and is attributable for the strong and sustained performance of the 
German Mittelstand and its longevity involving family dynasties (Carney et al., 2014; Franke 
et al., 2014; Houben & Maiterth, 2011). The German Inheritance Tax Law is based on a his-
torical protection of a sense of family and helps to maintain the unity of the family capital 
base, which maintains the stability of family businesses of German SMEs for generations 
(Carney et al., 2014). Germany introduced its inheritance tax (based on the Prussian 
Inheritance Tax Law of 1873) in 1906, with the children and spouses being excluded from any 
tax, as the Conservative Party feared the destruction of the sense of family. The heated debates 
surrounding the levying of an inheritance tax, and in particular the noninclusion of children 
and spouses, ultimately even led to the end of Reichskanzler von Bülow’s tenure. Children 
and spouses later were included for the first time through the fiscal reforms in 1919, with a 
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top rate of 35%. Subsequent reforms were introduced in 1925, with the inheritance tax law 
for the remainder of the twentieth century being basically based on the tax law of 1925. The 
tax rate of class I was reduced further to 15% and only increased later in 1974 during the 
social- liberal coalition. Overall, it can be concluded that the inheritance tax policy in Germany 
has been tax- friendly for family businesses. By contrast, a tax exemption for large corporate 
assets was introduced only as recently as the 1990s. In 1993, a tax allowance was introduced 
on business assets valued under 500.000 DM (Standortsicherungsgesetz). This tax allowance 
was expanded in 1996 to corporate excess of 500,000 DM at a rate of 75%. In fact, the tax 
reform of 2009 was declared partially unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court, 
partly because of the generous tax exemptions for family business assets, but later was per-
mitted with certain amendments.
The System of Corporate Boards
A second element involving the institutional context of a country influencing the manifestation 
of entrepreneurship involves the system of corporate boards and governance. Legislation con-
cerning the governance of corporations imposes a monistic, dualistic or hybrid structure of cor-
porate boards. The system of corporate governance in the institutional context of the Anglo- Saxon 
countries consists of one tier, and is characterized by a board of directors, typically presided by 
a CEO and Chairperson, with the ultimate goal of maximizing the shareholder value of the 
company.
By contrast, the two- tier system differs by having both a management board as well as a 
supervisory board. While the management board is responsible for day- to- day business opera-
tions, the supervisory board controls and monitors the managers’ resource allocation of corporate 
assets (Rouyer, 2013). The dualistic board structure is conducive to the emergence of niche- 
family firms. By contrast, monistic boards are more conducive to the emergence of scalable 
mass- market firms, as Figure 3 underlines. This is because the separation of boards into supervi-
sory and management functions facilitate the long- term control of the firm by the family through 
monitoring, approving and dismissing board managers. The independence of directors from 
management stands out as one of the most salient antecedents for effectively monitoring manage-
ment (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004).
While the literature on board composition has thoroughly analyzed the importance of the 
social and human capital of board members, Hillman and Dalziel (2003, p. 385) use the lens 
provided by the principal- agent model to examine the insider- outsiders interplay. In particular, 
they find that “dependence on the current CEO/organization creates a disincentive for insiders 
and dependent outsiders to side with shareholders when their interests oppose those of manage-
ment,” suggesting that dualistic boards enable the separation of management and control, and 
thus reduce agency costs (Chrisman et al., 2004, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shepherd & 
Haynie, 2009; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
The literature has generally found the existence of a trade- off between monitoring effective-
ness and agency costs. This suggests that if a family serves as owner- manager within the firm, 
agency costs are reduced as goal conflicts that might arise from the separation of management 
and control diminish (Fama & Jensen, 1983). However, board dependence in the firm is high, 
which in turn reduces the effectiveness of monitoring (if the family is also present within the 
board).
A dualistic board system enables families to control the company through the supervisory 
board, because they are able to dismiss managers and therewith can exercise their control in the 
long- term, thus benefitting the preservation of family dynasties. By contrast, through a common 
level of information, unitary boards enable faster information flows, which is more conducive to 
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strategic and dynamic strategies, such as intermediate market adaptions (Bellavite Pellegrini & 
Sironi, 2017; Bezemer et al., 2014; Millet‐Reyes & Zhao, 2010; Wollschlager & Reuter- 
Kumpmann, 2004). Thus, a monistic board system of corporate governance is more conducive to 
fostering an environment for high- growth entrepreneurship characterized by radical innovation.
In the unitary board system of governance the board is not hampered by the information 
asymmetry that arises in the two- tier board system, where all of the relevant information for the 
corporate strategy that stems from employees, customers and financing, and so on reaches the 
supervisory board only through the management board and thus can be filtered in a strategic way 
( Wollschlager & Reuter- Kumpmann, 2004). Thus, the unitary board system of governance is 
able to make decisions faster and with more complete information.
Legal Origin and Capital Market Development
A third aspect of the institutional context involves the rule of law and financial capital markets. 
In their seminal work, La Porta et al. (1998) analyzed the development of financial markets 
around the world and found that investor protection was weaker in institutional contexts charac-
terized by civil law than in institutional contexts characterized by common law. They suggest 
that the costs of obtaining financial capital are higher in civil law contexts, since investors receive 
less protection against the expropriation by corporate insiders and are therefore less willing to 
finance firms. Thus, residual claimants are better incentivized in the common law countries to 
provide external finance, while the less residual cash- flow rights are disadvantaged by the greater 
hazard of corporate insiders. A consequence in civil law countries is that smaller equity markets 
result in less market capitalization, which is crucial for early stage finance, such as the develop-
ment of liquid venture capital (Black & Gilson, 1999). Thus, shareholder- friendly environments 
Figure 3. The distribution of world- market leaders and unicorns according the system of 
corporate boards. Source. own depiction, measured as per 10 Million capita. For reasons of graphical 
representation the values for niche economy are per 100,000 capita, the same holds for Figures 4 and 5.
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support the emergence of scalable mass- market firms, because they require early stage finance 
and are often venture capital backed (Figure 4).
A well- developed stock market enables new ventures spurred by innovative activity to effi-
ciently cash- out in an IPO, which in turn explains the interrelated nature of the stock and venture 
capital markets (Black & Gilson, 1999). By contrast, countries with weak investor protection 
exhibit a high share of large block holdings. In the case of easier access to private benefits of 
control, concentrated ownership safeguards residual claims (Bebchuk, 1999; La Porta et al., 
1999). Black and Gilson (1999) conclude that the bank- based capital market of Germany is infe-
rior to a market- based system such as the United States, in its ability to provide liquid capital 
markets.
However, banks play a core role for the corporate landscape, for example, in Germany, and 
are the major financial intermediary there (Agarwal et al., 2001; Lehmann & Neuberger, 2001; 
Levine, 2002; Vitols, 2001). Bank deposits and direct loans are the most common financial assets 
and liabilities in Germany (Vitols, 2001). To this effect, banks consider themselves as reliable 
partners for family firms in a long- term engagement, therefore incentivizing mutual specific 
investments in trust and knowledge. As banks monitor and advise the controlling management, a 
mutual incentive scheme encompasses steady, as opposed to radical, growth. Bank finance pro-
vides the perfect climate or conditions for nurturing and sustaining niche family firms.
In contrast to the bank- based financial system of Germany, the U.S. cultivated a liberal market 
economy that resulted in a market- based capital system assuring a liquid supply of financial 
capital. A stock- market centered capital market “is said to encourage short- term expectations by 
investors and hence short- term strategies by managers” (Black & Gilson, 1999, p. 36), resulting 
in shareholder value as leading paradigm (Friedman, 1970). In contrast to bank- based financial 
systems, such as Germany, the market- based capital market provides the perfect climate, or con-
ditions, to scale unicorns. In addition, shareholdings in Germany mostly are concentrated in large 
Figure 4. The distribution of world- market leaders and unicorns according to their legal origin. Source. 
own depiction.
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blocks and often in the hands of banks or institutional investors (Ehrhardt et al., 2006; La Porta 
et al., 1998), which in turn mitigates the tradability of shares and thus their liquidity, so that the 
requisite financing for scalable firms like unicorns is hampered.
Economic Geography
Still another dimension of the institutional context involves geographic proximity and the poten-
tial for spatially bound knowledge spillovers. Spatial proximity within knowledge clusters 
enables the research and development (R&D) investments of both private industry and universi-
ties to spillover as positive externalities (Acs et al., 2009). The new knowledge created but not 
commercialized by those firms and organizations creating that knowledge generates new entre-
preneurial opportunities (Audretsch, 2007). Such spatially localized clusters provide the perfect 
breeding ground for high- tech entrepreneurial firms, such as unicorns. Both unicorns and world- 
market leaders are highly innovative firms that very often produce high- tech and knowledge- 
intensive products. Still, both firm types differ in the way they create and absorb knowledge for 
their production function. World- market leaders are vertically integrated to a large extent and 
generally create product knowledge within the boundaries of their organization in a closed pro-
duction function. By contrast, unicorns instead benefit from industrial clusters and knowledge 
spillovers inherent within close geographic proximity of firms and research institutes. Urban 
agglomerations are characterized a high population density are therefore conducive to knowl-
edge creation and spillovers. As Porter found, clusters are typically located in urban agglomera-
tions (Porter, 2000), where also most universities tend to be located. This would suggest that 
larger cities generate both more knowledge as well as a greater capacity for knowledge spill-
overs, which is conducive to unicorns and a scale economy. Thus, knowledge clusters result in a 
number of positive economies, such as attracting and sustaining human capital and fostering the 
commercialization of radical innovations, both of which are highly conducive for the emergence 
of scale economies and its unicorns.
By contrast, the niche economy relies less on highly aggregated concentrations of economic 
activity, but rather on leveraging the location of Mittelstand companies in rural and peripheral 
locations. For example, in Germany 70 percent of the world- market niche leaders are located in 
rural areas and span all regions of Germany. How can the surprisingly strong innovative perfor-
mance of the rural world- market niche leaders (in terms of patents and R&D) be reconciled with 
the knowledge spillover theory of regions, in order to understand “the spatial dimensions of 
innovative activity” (Audretsch & Feldman, 2004, p. 2714)? This seemingly contradicts 
Krugman’s (1991, p. 5) conclusion that concentration “is the most striking feature of the geogra-
phy of economic activity”.
The reconciliation of this apparent contradiction challenging the importance of spatially 
localized knowledge spillovers lies in the nature and type of innovative activity. Even though 
niche world- market leaders invest in R&D and produce knowledge intensive products, their type 
of innovation is better characterized as incremental and not radical. They are less dependent upon 
knowledge spillovers and knowledge clusters as a source of knowledge. This is consistent with 
their location in isolated and remote rural areas, with a paucity of geographic proximity to other 
firms and universities. Other country- level samples of world- market leaders find support for this 
in various countries such as Greece (Voudouris et al., 2000), Sweden (Din et al., 2011) or Spain 
(Muñoz et al., 2017). In addition, their strategy of a focus on niche markets implies a high degree 
of specialization, limiting the potential to absorb external knowledge for specialized products. 
Since they are characterized as quasi- monopolists, they largely control the speed of innovation 
and thus product and business- life cycles within their markets, often being the sole supplier of 
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products. The customer- relations often are characterized by trustful long- term relations and rela-
tional capital, with no compelling need to disrupt their own market.
Vocational schools are essential for the provision of complementary highly skilled and trained 
labor and more specifically, for the highly specialized niche strategy firms. Their decentralized 
distribution fits with the decentralized distribution of niche firms (Lehmann et al., 2019), and 
they are less reliant on university graduates as part of their workforce. Thus, employees often 
enjoy the possibility to remain located within their home regions (Fischer et al., 1998), which 
increases organizational identification (Mael & Ashforth, 1992) with and loyalty to their employer 
(Keeble & Tyler, 1995). Given the shortage of outside opportunities within rural labor markets, 
a mutual lock- in safeguards specific investments of both contractual parties. This in turn leads to 
long- term working relationships and investment horizons on both sides, which fits complemen-
tarily to the high degree of knowledge specialization strategy of niche firms (Audretsch et al., 
2018; Baù et al., 2019). According to Mitchell et al. (2001), SMEs and the dense social networks 
present in rural areas increase the job embeddedness of highly place- specific human capital. Job 
embeddedness refers to the attachment of employees to the place they work and live in and “the 
extent to which people have links to other people or activities, (2) the extent to which their jobs 
and communities are similar to or fit with the other aspects in their life spaces, and, (3) the ease 
with which links can be broken” (Mitchell et al., 2001, p. 1104).
The System of Vocational Education
The educational systems of a country provide another element of the institutional context. 
National educational systems differ largely with regard to graduation rates of universities or 
vocational schools and thus the type of human capital present within the societal skill base of the 
workforce. According to Lehmann et al. (2019, p. 5), “in a technologically advanced economy, 
the societal skill base curve must stay parallel to and head of the technological implementation 
curve.” The complementarity of skills within the societal workforce therefore is decisive to 
explain the divergence of niche and scale economies. While some economies hold individuals 
responsible for private investments in their human capital base, other economies provide it as a 
public good.
Lehmann et al. (2019) point out that vocational education systems that are both dual and cen-
trally organized on a state level favor the provision of specific human capital, which is comple-
mentary to the human capital needs of niche economies as employees are better incentivized to 
invest their stock of specific human capital (Figure 5). For example, Germany is highly recog-
nized for its dual apprentice system, where apprentices gain both practical and theoretical skills 
through firm- based training programs and upper- secondary general education within vocational 
schools.
Countries with centrally organized and dual vocational education systems host the highest 
number of niche world- market leaders. Their education systems produce a combination of gen-
eral and firm- specific human capital, which best suits the complementary requirements of their 
specialized niche business model. Therefore, employees are willing to accept potential wage 
penalties from investments in their specific human capital skill base, at least partially, due to the 
lack of labor mobility, which is the case of the rural Mittelstand companies in Germany. This 
results in a mutual- lock in position for both the employer and employee, and safeguards the 
internalization of quasi- rents, which fosters mutual long- term investments in the skill base (Hart, 
1988; Williamson, 1975) and in turn decreases the likelihood of hold- up and subsequent under-
investment of both parties (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990).
By contrast, while the striking role that universities play in the emergence of knowledge clus-
ters is conducive for scale economies (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2006), the high mobility rates of 
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employees within knowledge clusters indicate that their human capital is less specific (Almeida 
& Kogut, 1999). Mass higher education is more conducive to the general human capital required 
by scale economy firms than for the specific skills required by the niche strategy firms. The 
Anglo- Saxon countries have developed a decentralized education system in which individuals 
are urged to invest in their own skill base - public spending for education is deprioritized 
(Lehmann et al., 2019).
Data, Method and Results
Section four conducts an empirical analysis to test the propositions of our context- choice model 
as outlined above. In particular, we measure the prevalence of contextual variables and how they 
determine the complementary emergence of Niche Entrepreneurship within national economies. 
We argue that the prevalence of complementarities attracts, selects and fosters entrepreneurial 
firms in a specific way. Therefore, we propose that the two systems in our model are rather 
homogenous within their regimes, but heterogeneous to each other. Thus, the underlying null 
hypothesis is that the manifestation of Niche Entrepreneurship is not determined by the relevant 
context variables. Our data average a period comprising the years 2014–2017. Using a panel 
structure seemed inappropriate, as most variables display either constants or little variation. The 
data were hand collected and include 217 countries. Table 2 lists the variables having been used 
for the analysis. We relied on a variety of sources for our data such as the World Bank, the 
UNESCO, Cedevop (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training), the OECD 
among others. Based on a broad literature review, we compile measures for the centrality and 
Figure 5. The distribution of world- market leaders and unicorns according to the systems of vocational 
education. Source. own depiction.
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duality of vocational education, expanding earlier work on this topic (Lehmann et al., 2019). 
Table 2 reveals further details on how the index is composed. The same applies for the index on 
the dualistic nature of board systems.
The dependent variable within this study measures the worldwide emergence of Niche 
Entrepreneurship, operationalized by the number of world- market leaders and therefore esti-
mated through negative binomial regressions to accord to their nature of being count data 
(Nunnally, 1978; Sturman, 1999). To identify whether a poisson or negative binomial regression 
is preferable, the literature takes the view that overdispersed data should be analyzed using neg-
ative binomial regressions. The likelihood- ratio test for the degree of overdispersion alpha shows 
a χ² value of 1,383.18 and thus our H0 (p value = 0.000) can be strongly rejected: As assumed, 
overdispersion is current within the data. This in turn suggests that it is preferable to use a nega-
tive binomial model over poisson. To control for size effects, we specify the logarithm of a coun-
try’s population as exposure variable. Literature suggests this approach, whenever a count 
variable can rather be interpreted through a rate (e.g., per capita) than the mere count (Choi et al., 
2016; Houston, 2007; Law et al., 2011; Qin et al., 2006; Tarko et al. (1999) ).
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 3. The dependent variable describes the emer-
gence of Niche Entrepreneurship per country. Germany is the economy with the largest Niche 
Entrepreneurship sector, followed by Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg and Sweden (per cap-
ita). Dual VET and Civil Law are binary dummy variables. The bivariate correlations as illus-
trated in Table 4 prove that multicollinearity between the independent and control variables is 
none of an issue. No correlation between the independent variables is higher than 0.772, which 
it is between Global mindset and GDP per capita. The literature suggests the use of a spearman 
correlation coefficient whenever data is not normally distributed (Artusi et al., 2002), as it is 
often given for count data.
Results and Discussion
This study aims at explaining the prevalence of Niche Entrepreneurship within national econo-
mies, measured by the number of small and medium sized niche world- market leaders by coun-
try. Therefore, our empirical analysis tests the influence of selected context variables and how 
they determine the emergence of Niche Entrepreneurship as context- choice complementarities. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable N Mean Sd Min Max
Niche Entrepreneurship 217 12.410 94.032 0 1,307
Centrality of VET 214 1.537 0.654 1 3
Dualistic board 211 1.223 0.528 1 3
Inheritance tax 177 0.081 0.134 0 0.550
Civil law 217 0.350 0.478 0 1
Industry cluster 217 0.407 1.886 0 21.598
Dual VET 217 0.051 0.220 0 1
Global mindset 191 59.388 22.331 13.471 98.406
GDP per capita 217 16,888.460 24,781.790 304.810 170,067.700
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Models one to five (Table 5) show the results for negative binomial regressions of our indepen-
dent variables, model six shows the full model. While the dependent variable used in every 
model is Niche Entrepreneurship, the controls are used equally throughout each estimation pro-
cess. The results for the centrality of vocational education, board systems, a country’s legal ori-
gin and industry cluster show the expected results. Yet, the effect of the inheritance taxation 
surprises, as no effect was found. With regard to the full model, the results show that the dualistic 
nature of corporate boards has a strong positive effect on the emergence of Niche Entrepreneurship. 
Table 4. Matrix of Correlations.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Niche Entrepreneurship 1.000
(2) Centrality of VET 0.373*** 1.000
(3) Dualistic board 0.456*** 0.491*** 1.000
(4) Inheritance tax 0.181** 0.095 −0.016 1.000
(5) Civil law 0.312*** 0.533*** 0.512*** 0.151** 1.000
(6) Industry cluster 0.757*** 0.292*** 0.424*** 0.103 0.274*** 1.000
(7) Dual VET 0.474*** 0.303*** 0.395*** 0.086 0.271*** 0.437*** 1.000
(8) Global mindset 0.266*** 0.005 0.189*** 0.006 0.141* 0.332*** 0.278*** 1.000
(9) GDP per capita 0.420*** 0.127* 0.319*** 0.103* 0.189*** 0.443*** 0.289*** 0.772*** 1.000
Note. Spearman’s correlation coefficient. *** p < .01, ** p <.05, * p <0.1.
Table 5. Negative Binomial Regressions.













Centrality of VET 2.346*** 1.387**
(0.649) (0.671)
Dualistic board 1.625*** 1.463***
(0.508) (0.526)
Inheritance tax 2.775 2.860
(2.854) (2.220)
Civil law 1.836* 0.486
(1.090) (1.022)
Industry cluster −0.522** −0.397*
(0.229) (0.238)
Dual VET −1.065 −0.041 0.433 0.280 1.128 −0.600
(1.200) (1.068) (1.268) (1.319) (1.414) (1.095)
Global mindset −0.054** −0.046* −0.066** −0.090*** −0.072*** −0.031
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.024) (0.026)
GDP per capita 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Region Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cons. −8.668*** −7.482*** −4.875*** −4.680*** −5.377*** −9.295***
(1.881) (1.873) (1.632) (1.612) (1.707) (2.031)
Sample Size 190 188 157 191 191 155
R² 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.19
Note. Standarderrors are in parenthesis. *** p < 0.01,** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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The effects are strongly significant ( p. value <.01). The results further suggest that the centrality 
of VET, as proposed in an earlier work by Lehmann et al. (2019), has a positive impact on the 
emergence of Niche Entrepreneurship, too ( p. value <.05). Moreover, the full model also shows 
no effect for inheritance taxation. It is likely that the use of current taxation rates fails to explain 
the emergence of entrepreneurial models that has taken place for most of the past century. 
Therefore, longitudinal data comparing taxation rates for such a time frame could be more appro-
priate to explain the current company landscape within economies.
Civil Law, which resembles the legal origin, has a positive effect on Niche Entrepreneurship 
in model 4, as predicted. Within the full model instead, other explanatory variables seem to over-
shadow a country’s legal origin. Interestingly, the Duality of VET is not as important for niche 
firms compared to its state- organized nature, showing no significance. Consistent with our the-
ory, the effect of Industry clusters is negatively related to the emergence of Niche Entrepreneurship. 
This supports the view that decentralized economies with strong rural areas depend less on 
industry clusters and their knowledge spillover potential. The more economic activity is concen-
trated in urban agglomerations, the more difficult it is for rural areas to keep up economically. 
Industrial clusters draw talent and knowledge from the rural areas and thus prevent rural areas 
from keeping up.
Another control variable reveals interesting information. Simon (2009) argues that a global 
mindset is supportive for the emergence of niche firms. In our context- choice model, this would 
imply that a context rich of intercultural knowledge complements the internationalization strate-
gies of niche firms (e.g., attained through foreign language education, in- and outgoing numbers 
of students etc.). This line of reasoning takes the view that a globalized mindset antecedes the 
global outreach of world- market leaders, as they sell internationally through high export rates 
and a high number of sales and manufacturing subsidiaries. Contrary to this, Audretsch et al. 
(2018) argue that this instead is attributable to the nature of narrow niche markets and technology 
dependence that match demand and supply. Whenever a highly specialized product is required 
that might be produced by only a handful of suppliers, a global mindset plays a minor role. Based 
on our estimations, the results back this latter notion, as it has no effect on the emergence of 
Niche Entrepreneurship in the full model.
Conclusion
In search of entrepreneurship champions, scholars and practitioners alike have been keen to 
measure, compare and contrast the extent of entrepreneurship across countries. Such compari-
sons warrant a singular view of entrepreneurship. This paper challenges this view and suggests 
that maybe we have been asking the wrong question about entrepreneurship. It may be less about 
who has more but rather how it is expressed differently across different institutional contexts. As 
Welter et al. (2017) warn, the focus has been gravitating towards the Silicon Valley model of 
entrepreneurship as the only bona fide characterization of entrepreneurship. By contrast, a view 
emerged that underlines the multiple manifestations of entrepreneurship, such as family firms 
and the Mittelstand. This paper has attempted to explain why the institutional national context 
may result in very different types or manifestations of entrepreneurship across countries. 
Therefore, the key contribution of this paper is to illustrate the heterogeneity of entrepreneurship 
manifestations through the complementarity of context- choice variables, as proposed in Robert’s 
model (2004). Our empirical results support our model and underline the prevalence of different 
manifestations of entrepreneurship according to complementary institutional contexts. The the-
ory of complementarities as known from the familiar insight of the production theory of firms 
also applies to various regimes of entrepreneurship manifestations. Our global sample shows that 
niche and Silicon Valley entrepreneurs spread as archetypical patterns in different contexts. The 
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adaptation of the entrepreneurs aims to gain the best possible strategy- environment fit (Barney, 
1991). Whether in a regime that is complementary for niche firms or in a regime that is comple-
mentary for scaling models, each is a rather closed system that imposes a selection process on 
adaptive firms. Actors that are not fit for the institutional arrangement of the economy are dis-
placed over time, which is why we observe rather homogeneous systems that differ more among 
each other than internally.
The underlying theory of our study is that country specific institutions provide the framework 
and incentives for the organizational context manifested by entrepreneurial activity. Specific 
examples of such institutional aspects include the system of the inheritance tax, corporate (firm) 
governance, finance, locational spillovers, and education. While one institutional configuration 
is conducive to scale entrepreneurship, characterized by radical innovation, high growth, quick 
market exit and unicorns, a very different institutional configuration suggests that entrepreneur-
ship is manifested by a long- term strategic niche strategy. Even though the firms in these two 
models are strikingly different, they can be characterized as being entrepreneurial. The specific 
contexts of a global set of national economies are compared and contrasted to explain the emer-
gence of two different types of entrepreneurship – the Silicon Valley model with its scalability on 
the one hrand, and the Mittelstand with its specialized niche strategy on the other. The underlying 
institutional context is attributable to the resulting different manifestations of entrepreneurship. 
Though, the factors and contexts that have shaped complementary institutional patterns for both 
entrepreneurship models that originated in the U.S. (Silicon Valley Model) and Germany (Niche 
Family Firms) are not confined to the United States and Germany: In fact, our empirical analysis 
shows that these relationships appear systematically on a global level.
A further important qualification of this study is that the dichotomy characterizing the institu-
tional context is a tendency and not discrete. Many counterexamples prevail. For example, niche 
strategy family firms are prevalent in the United States, such as Equinix, TransDigm and Ulta 
Beauty. Similarly, Germany has high performing unicorns, such as Delivery Hero, Hellofresh 
and Home24. Still, the model linking the underlying institutional context to the manifestation of 
entrepreneurial activity suggests a great propensity for niche strategy family firms, for example, 
in Germany, and highly innovative and high growth firms, for example, in the United States. 
Moreover, another important aspect revolves around the question of endogeneity. While we 
focus our line of reasoning on the external context to precede entrepreneurial behavior and its 
outcomes, we do not want to imply that entrepreneurs cannot impact the context they are sur-
rounded with. The context, on the other hand, can essentially be shaped by the actors. We are not 
able to solve the problem of endogeneity ultimately (whether the context has attracted the actors 
or whether there is a reverse causality and the actors actually have shaped the relevant context). 
Among others, at least three factors explain modes how actors can shape the context: 1) compa-
nies can exploit positive spillover effects through their proximity to similar companies and thus 
ensure that other actors specialize in this area, 2) public policy has the possibility to shape the 
context through various policies (e.g., a tax reduction for venture capital or amending the taxa-
tion of profits and employee options) or 3) incumbent companies can be displaced by companies 
that adapt more successfully to environmental conditions and thereby shape their environment 
themselves, where a path- dependent change in context variables takes place.
The empirical evidence provided in this paper is consistent with the view that the underlying 
institutional context influences not just the amount of entrepreneurship, but also the type of 
entrepreneurial activity. However, using samples of specific firms to measure the size of niche 
and scale entrepreneurship is subject to a sampling bias. In addition, alternative measures of the 
inheritance tax need to be used. Perhaps most importantly is the complicated lagged structure 
between tax policies and the manifestation of entrepreneurship. It is the tax policies of the past 
decades and even centuries that may explain the different contemporary manifestations of 
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entrepreneurship across institutional contexts. And finally, there are many nuanced manifesta-
tions of entrepreneurship and this paper has restricted itself to focus on two polar models. 
Research is mandated to highlight further manifestations of entrepreneurship and explore which 
contexts determine which complementarities. Therefore, this study attempts to pave the way for 
future research avenues.
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